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Abstract: Recent years’ enzootic spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus among poultry 
and the many lethal zoonoses in its wake has stimulated basic and applied pandemic 
vaccine research. The quest for an efficacious, affordable and timely accessible pandemic 
vaccine has been high on the agenda. When a variant H1N1 strain of swine origin emerged 
as a pandemic virus, it surprised many, as this subtype is well-known to man as a seasonal 
virus. This review will cover some difficult vaccine questions, such as the immunological 
challenges, the new production platforms, and the limited supply and global equity issues. 
Keywords:  influenza; H5N1; H1N1; pandemic; vaccine; haemagglutinin (HA); 
neuraminidase (NA) 
 
1. Introduction  
While most people had anticipated the next pandemic virus to have a novel HA subtype of avian 
origin (such as H5), the sudden emergence in 2009 and the rapid global spread of swine-origin 
influenza A (H1N1) virus (H1N1 pandemic virus) surprised many. The World Health Organization 
declared the pandemic (Phase 6) on June 11 after nearly 30,000 confirmed cases have been reported in 
74 countries [1]. 
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Preceding and following the transition to Phase 6, there was a flurry of publications on the genetic 
and antigenic characterization of the new virus [2-6]. There was a general consensus about the origin 
of the H1N1 pandemic virus, being the result of multiple reassortments steps between human H3N2, 
North American avian virus, and H1 from swine virus from the Eurasian lineage. The gestation period 
for this new H1N1 virus apparently started in the late 1990’s and culminated in swine at some 
undefined recent time-point prior to the emergence of the final virus in man. Also, the antigenic 
properties clearly indicated that the HA of the H1N1 pandemic strain was only distantly related to 
current seasonal H1N1 viruses [6]. This virus transmits easily and generally causes mild disease, 
although severe illness (respiratory distress) and apparent high fatalities were reported, mostly so 
during the first weeks in Mexico [7]. The worldwide spread of the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) and 
the continuous sporadic zoonotic cases of avian H5N1 increase the risk of the reassortment between 
the two viruses and therefore constitute an additional global threat.  
Although influenza drugs remain a useful supplement, and occasionally also the only option for 
therapeutic and prophylactic intervention, emerging resistant strains could make them inefficient [8,9]. 
Whereas the H1N1 pandemic virus initially was shown to be resistant to the adamantanes, it was at 
first sensitive to the NA inhibitor drug oseltamivir, setting it aside from the seasonal H1N1 virus in 
recent years. A report by the WHO described sporadic cases of tamiflu resistant strains [10]. Whether 
such resistant strains will spread and become dominant remains to be seen, but it points to our current 
and very limited assortment of influenza drugs as a fragile part of our arsenal. Widespread 
indiscriminate and ad lib use of antivirals both in man and in animals in some countries will facilitate 
emergence of drug resistant strains. Also, and as a direct consequence of wasteful drug use, waterways 
could be contaminated and potentially set the scene for development of drug resistant influenza strains 
in aquatic birds [11]. This in itself poses a human health hazard, considering the potential exchange of 
influenza genes between the avian pool and human viruses. The large stockpiles of oseltamivir 
generated by many affluent countries as a major element of their pandemic preparedness, could 
potentially be of little use or even become ineffective.  
Inactivated vaccines against influenza virus was first made during the 1940s, initially aimed at 
military personnel, but later also targeted for the civilian population, particularly the elderly and those 
at risk of serious illness and death. Our best option to mitigate the health and societal consequences of 
a pandemic is to have access to an efficacious vaccine in a timely manner [12]. Vaccination is the best 
option by which spread of a pandemic virus could be slowed down or halted and severity of disease 
reduced. Whereas the avian H5N1 virus, currently in WHO Pandemic Phase 3, belongs to a subtype 
against which virtually none has any pre-existing immunity, the H1N1 pandemic virus subtype has 
been circulating in man for the most parts of the 20
th century and until today. It has been shown that 
senior age cohorts of the population have some degree of immunity to the H1N1 pandemic virus [13]. 
This difference in pre-existing immunity and degree of previous priming will of course affect the 
vaccination strategies, as well as the dosage and number of immunizations needed to elicit the 
minimally required levels of vaccine-induced serum antibodies. Furthermore, neither for the H5N1 nor 
for the H1N1 pandemic virus do we know to what extent any vaccine-induced subtype priming will 
lessen the clinical impact when subsequently infected by the pandemic virus. Several new adjuvants 
have been clinically tried and licensed in Europe during the recent years [14,15]. Especially for H5N1 
vaccines, oil-in-water based emulsions show great promises, whereas split or subunit formulations in Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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combination with alum mainly fall short. Whole virion formulations, and also virus-like-particles 
(VLPs), perform well. 
To supply enough tailor-made pandemic vaccines to the entire world’s population is a formidable 
challenge to global equity. Both the limited supply and the cost of vaccines will set the poor and  
non-industrialized countries in a difficult position. The lack of adequate health care infrastructure in 
the third world is an additional concern  
2. Influenza Vaccines 
2.1. Background; Seasonal Vaccines 
Influenza vaccination is the most effective prophylactic measure to prevent morbidity and mortality 
(reviewed in [16]). There are two main types of influenza vaccine available; inactivated vaccine 
delivered deep subcutaneously or intramuscularly and live attenuated vaccine administered 
intranasally. Parenterally administered inactivated influenza vaccines have been used for many 
decades and extensive information is available on their quality and safety, being about 60-80% 
effective in preventing disease against homologous or closely related strains. In some cases, 
vaccination may not prevent influenza morbidity, but rather reduce its severity and duration. 
Inactivated vaccines are available in whole, split (chemically disrupted), subunit (purified surface 
glycoproteins) and virosomal/virus-like particles (VLPs) containing surface glycoproteins 
formulations.  
Current inactivated vaccines are mostly produced by propagation in embryonated hens’ eggs. The 
allantoic fluid is harvested, and the virus is concentrated and highly purified, then inactivated by 
formaldehyde or beta-propiolactone, or eventually by the detergent disruption procedure itself. The 
availability of embryonated hens’ eggs is a limiting factor in vaccine production and the global 
manufacturing capacity is not expected to meet pandemic vaccine demands. It is therefore important to 
develop dose-sparing strategies by using effective formulations and/or adjuvants. Some manufacturers 
are using cell cultures as vaccine substrate (MDCK, Vero, PerC6®), either as their only platform or as 
a supplement, allowing more expediently to scale up of production (Table 1). 
The use of reverse genetics technology can save a considerable amount of time in generation of 
pandemic seed virus. Traditionally, influenza vaccine seed viruses have been made by classical 
reassortment by choosing a virus isolate which closely matches circulating strains, and introducing its 
surface glycoprotein gene segments (HA and NA) into the genetic background of the laboratory-
adapted and high-yielding “PR8” virus, A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (H1N1). Seed viruses are produced by  
co-infection of the two “parent” viruses, and screening for the progeny of interest. This is a time-
consuming process and not always successful. And even so, the growth characteristics may not be 
acceptable. The use of reverse genetics allows viruses to be constructed with a predefined set of genes, 
following combination of plasmid DNAs encoding separate RNA segments. Site-directed mutagenesis 
allows engineering of the DNA transcripts to create viruses altered in specific genes. Highly 
pathogenic avian strains can be attenuated to create a depathogenised virus, which can be used as a 
vaccine strain, e.g. NIBRG-14 derived from A/Vietnam/1194/2004 (H5N1), which has been 
extensively used in human clinical trials. However, some of the recent vaccine reassortants vaccine Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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strains for the pandemic H1N1 virus, whether prepared by classical reassortment or by reverse 
genetics, have been reported to give low yields. 
Table 1. Main properties of the most widely used influenza vaccines. 
Type of 
influenza 
vaccine 
Substrate 
1) 
Route of 
administration
Immune 
response 
2) 
Immunologica
l challenges 
Comments 
Inactivated      
No apparent 
stimulation of 
mucosal 
immunity 
 
Whole virion 
Embryonated 
eggs, cell 
culture  
intramuscular 
Strong, 
mixed 
Th1/Th2 
 
Supply of 
embryonated eggs is a 
limiting factor. 
Cell-grown vaccine 
production more 
scalable. 
Split Mostly  Th2
Should be 
adjuvanted 
Subunit (HA 
and NA) 
Mostly Th2
Least 
immunogenic, 
should be 
adjuvanted 
Live 
attenuated 
Embryonated 
eggs 
intranasal 
Humoral, 
cellular, 
mucosal 
Should 
perform better 
in the elderly 
Rapid and large 
vaccine output. Easily 
scalable production. 
Cannot be used in the 
very young and the 
immunocompromised.
1) MDCK (Madin Darby Canine Kidney cells), Vero (African green monkey kidney cells), PerC6
® (human embryonic 
retinal cells); 2) Th1 and Th2 are T-cell subsets heralding cellular and humoral response, respectively. 
 
Live attenuated seasonal vaccines have been used in Russia since the 1970s and have been licensed 
for use in the USA since 2003. There are two strains A/Leningrad/134/17/57 (H2N2) and A/Ann 
Arbor/6/60 (H2N2), which have been used as donor strains. They are attenuated, genetically stable, 
non-transmissible, safe, immunogenic, and provide protective immunity. Importantly, live attenuated 
vaccines can be rapidly manufactured and provide more vaccine doses per egg than inactivated 
vaccines, and they are conveniently administered by intranasal spray devices. Live attenuated vaccines 
induce a good mucosal response, which upon challenge with field strains may limit their initial 
replication in the upper respiratory tract, the viral portal of entry. These vaccines perform well in 
children, reduce laboratory confirmed infection in adults, but are less immunogenic in the elderly. A 
comprehensive review of the current status of attenuated live influenza vaccines is given by Ambrose 
et al. [17]. Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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2.2. Pandemic Vaccines 
2.2.1. Non-H1 pandemic vaccines 
One of the most important interventions in pandemic control is to provide a safe and effective 
vaccine in a timely manner. Most of the extensive development work on pandemic vaccines has 
focused on the H5 subtype, although some trials have used other avian subtypes such as H7 and H9, as 
well as the historic human subtype H2N2 (Table 1).  
As reported by the WHO there were in 2008 more than 70 registered clinical trials of candidate 
pandemic influenza vaccines, less than 10 have used alternative production platform such as DNA 
vaccines, recombinant proteins made in E. coli and by engineered baculovirus in insect cells [18]. The 
vaccines have been reported as safe and well tolerated. The majority of the trials have been performed 
in young healthy adults, although recent trials have involved the elderly and young children. There are 
a number of vaccine manufactures having been granted regulatory approval for their H5N1 vaccines in 
Europe, USA and Australasia. The experience gained in development of pandemic vaccines to date has 
provided essential information on formulation, dosage, and use of adjuvants, and has saved valuable 
time in preparing a vaccine against the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. The hope is that this will have an 
important impact on the public health particularly if a safe, immunogenic and appropriately formulated 
vaccine can be rapidly prepared in sufficient quantities. The use of a single dose regimen with a novel 
avian subtype is not sufficient for an immunologically naïve population, while a two dose vaccination 
course more often results in sero-conversion and fulfilment of the European CHMP (The Committee 
for Medicinal Products for Human Use) requirements [19-21].  
A two-dose regimen of Vero cell grown whole H5N1 virus vaccine (7.5 or 15 g HA) elicited good 
serum antibody responses in adults against antigenically diverse H5N1 virus strains. However, whilst 
whole virus vaccines have proved more immunogenic in unprimed adults than split or subunit 
vaccines, the majority of manufacturers are technically unable to convert their current split or subunit 
vaccine production process to whole virus formulations [21,22]. Current seasonal influenza vaccines 
contain 15 µg HA from each of the three seasonal strains, with a total of 45 µg HA. In contrast, very 
high antigen doses (up to 90 µg HA) were required for non-adjuvanted split virus or recombinant 
pandemic H5 vaccines to elicit an antibody response sufficient to meet the licensing criteria [23,24]. 
This underlines the need for effective adjuvants to enhance the immune response to split or subunit 
pandemic influenza vaccines. Some of the best candidate vaccine formulations currently available are 
adjuvanted or whole virion vaccines (reviewed in [25-27]). 
Aluminium salts have so far been the most commonly used adjuvant, as they are non-proprietary 
and inexpensive, having been used in childhood vaccination programs for many years with an 
excellent safety record. For pandemic vaccines against avian HA, aluminium salts have only been 
shown to modestly augment the antibody response in adults after two doses of candidate pandemic 
vaccines; H5N1 influenza split virus vaccine (30-45 g HA) [28, 29], H7N1 split virus vaccine   
(12-24 g HA) [30], or low dose of H9N2 whole virus vaccine (1.9 g HA) [19,22]. In children from 6 
months to 9 years of age two doses of aluminium adjuvanted H5N1 split virus vaccine (30-45 g HA) 
were strongly immunogenic [31]. However, other trials found that aluminium adjuvant did not 
significantly enhance the antibody response to candidate H5 vaccines [32-34]. Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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Some of the most promising adjuvants are the proprietary oil-in-water emulsion based systems such 
as MF59 (Novartis) and ASO3 (GSK), which have been found to greatly enhance both homologous 
and cross reactive antibody responses after H5 vaccination even at lower antigen concentrations   
(3.8-7.5 g HA) [21,32,35-38]. In a direct side-by-side comparison of H5N1 vaccine adjuvanted with 
aluminium salts and MF59, the latter was found to outperform aluminium [32]. In prime boost studies 
with 2-3 doses of vaccine based on H5N3 clade 0 and a booster dose up to 8 years later with one dose 
of MF59 adjuvanted vaccine with clade 1 H5N1 vaccine induced a rapid increase in antibody response 
one week after vaccination which was broadly cross reactive against H5N1 variants [39,40]. The AS03 
adjuvant allowed dose sparing down to 3.8 g HA for the A/Vietnam/1194/04 H5N1 vaccine. This 
vaccine has undergone extensive clinical trials including in children and the elderly, and is now 
licensed in Europe. Formulation with AS03 adjuvant induced an effective homologous and cross clade 
immune response [37,41]. A more recently developed oil-in-water adjuvant is the AFO3 (sanofi), 
resulting in virtually similar dose-sparing and cross-reactivity, with more than 80% seropositivity after 
2 doses of 3,75 g and high degree of cross-clade cross-reactivity [42]. Also, preliminary results from 
an ongoing phase I clinical trial of virosomal H5N1 vaccine with a 3
rd generation ISCOM™ adjuvant 
have shown equal or greater ability to dose-sparing than oil-in-water emulsion systems, as well as high 
frequencies of polyfunctional Th1 CD4 cells. Data from the corresponding pre-clinical trial has been 
published [43].  
Table 2. Reassortant vaccine strains used in clinical trials of pandemic vaccines [18]. 
Virus strain  Subtype 
A/Singapore/1/57  H2N2 
A/duck/Singapore/97 H5N1 
A/Viet Nam/1194/2004 (NIBRG-14), clade 1  H5N1 
A/Indonesia/5/2005, clade 2.1  H5N1 
A/duck/Potsdam/88/92 (H5N2) x 
A/Leningrad/134/17/57 (H2N2) 
H5N2 
(live) 
A/chicken/Italy H7N1xPR8 (RD-3)  H7N1 
A/chicken/British Columbia/CN-6/2004  H7N3 
A/Hong Kong/1073/99  H9N2 
A/chicken/HongKong/G9/97 (H9N2) x 
A/AnnArbor/6/60 (H2N2)  
H9N2 
(live) 
 
Live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV) seed strains have been produced for a number of 
potential subtypes (H2, H4-16), as summarized in [44]. The live attenuated H9N2 vaccine was found 
to be immunogenic in seronegative adults. However, clinical trials of other avian live attenuated 
vaccines using the attenuated A/Ann Arbor/6/60 (H2N2) as partner, have found that the vaccine strains 
are further attenuated and have lower infectivity and consequently less immunogenic than seasonal 
H1N1 and H3N2 strains [45]. In contrast, two doses of an H5N2 vaccine produced with the 
A/Leningrad/134/17/57 (H2N2) as the donor strain, elicited good serum and local immune responses 
[46]. In further trials, two vaccine doses have been administered at a 10 days interval instead of 21 Viruses 2009, 1                                       
 
 
1095
days, and this increased the immunogenicity of the vaccine to homologous and heterologous strains  
(as reported in [44]). Although a recipient of an attenuated live vaccine virus is usually not contagious 
for others, there is always a theoretical risk of reassortment between other influenza viruses from man 
and/or animal sources. This elusive potential hazard should be weighed against the mostly excellent 
immune response, particularly mucosal and cytotoxic immunity, elicited by live vaccines and the 
potential to manufacture large quantities of vaccine within a short time span. 
2.2.2. H1N1 pandemic vaccines 
For the current H1N1 situation, the developments had followed a quick pace, a stark contrast to the 
drawn-out avian H5N1 threat that has been with us for more than a decade. The H1N1 pandemic virus 
was detected in Mexico in March 2009 and spread throughout Mexico and the United States in April, 
and subsequently beyond these two countries. During the months of May and June early online 
publications on the origin and the pandemic potential of the novel H1N1 became available [3-6]. WHO 
declared the pandemic (Phase 6) on 11 June 2009.  
On 22 May 2009, using pre- and post-vaccination sera from individuals having received previous 
seasons’ influenza vaccines, it was possible to gauge the cross-immunity to the H1N1 pandemic strain 
in various age groups by haemagglutination-inhibition and microneutralization tests [13]. It was 
demonstrated that, although about a third of elderly vaccinees (60+) had pre-vaccination antibodies 
against the pandemic H1N1 strain, the frequency of seropositives only rarely and marginally increased 
after vaccination with recent years’ seasonal vaccines. For younger age groups, and particularly for 
children, antibodies to the novel H1N1 virus was in essence absent, and no apparent recall of cross-
reactive antibodies was detected. It was concluded, although large segments of the populations have 
experienced the H1N1 subtype through previous infections or vaccinations,- that a vaccine against the 
pandemic H1N1 strain was needed. This study has been extended, including adjuvanted seasonal 
vaccines, and showed no additional cross-reaction to the pandemic H1N1 virus. Interestingly, using 
serum archives from the vaccine campaign in 1976 against the A/New Jersey (H1N1) swine influenza, 
a significant proportion (54%) sero-converted against the H1N1 pandemic virus [47].  
Still, it has been speculated whether seasonal vaccine will give some degree of protection against 
the pandemic H1N1 virus. As this virus belongs to a subtype that has circulated throughout decades, it 
is an intriguing question whether seasonal vaccines, containing H1N1 virus, will confer any immunity 
to the pandemic virus. In a matched case-control study from Mexico it was stated that some protection, 
particularly against severe outcome, was associated with being vaccinated against seasonal influenza 
[48], whereas a report from the CDC argues that such an effect has not been convincingly proven [49].  
Data from only a limited number of clinical trials have now been published [50-52]. The frequency 
of pre-existing antibodies varied somewhat in these trials. In an Australian study of subjects aged  
18-64 years about 30% (irrespective of age) had pre-vaccination haemagglutination-inhibition titres  
≥ 1:40, whereas a Chinese trial only showed low frequencies (1-6%) throughout all age groups [50,51]. 
In a European trial of subjects aged 18-50 years about 16% had protective pre-vaccination antibody 
levels [52]. Considering the poor reproducibility and variable sensitivity of current serological 
methods (haemagglutination-inhibition and microneutralization tests), and data from the three 
mentioned clinical trials, as well as the studies based on sero-archives [13,47], the degree of   Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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pre-pandemic herd immunity is not clear and whether there are major age and geographical 
differences. A more fundamental approach to estimate any potential pre-existing immunity has been 
published, using an influenza epitope sequences database and scanning the variability of T- and B-cell 
influenza H1N1 epitopes [53]. It was found that only 31% (8/36) of B-epitopes of the pandemic virus 
were conserved in relation to recent seasonal H1N1 strains, with only 17% conservation in the HA 
molecule. In contrast, and also demonstrated experimentally using peripheral blood lymphocytes from 
adults, approximately 70% of CD8
+ cells recognized invariant H1N1 epitopes. While T-cell immunity 
will not block viral infection, it will assist in dampening the clinical outcome. Considering the 
different age-related pathology of the current pandemic virus, it would have been useful also to 
investigate lymphocyte from children and the elderly in the same manner. 
In the Australian trial, using one dose of non-adjuvanted split egg-grown vaccine containing 15 μg 
HA, close to 97% of subjects attained protective antibody levels after 3 weeks [50]. No differences 
between age groups were observed, nor did the response improve by using 30 μg HA per dose. These 
are very encouraging results, clearly indicating that a dose reduction below 15 μg HA may be 
considered. Also, and equally encouraging for this non-adjuvanted vaccine, the scheduled 2
nd dose 
may not be immediately required.  
In the Chinese study it was used egg-grown alum-adjuvanted and non-adjuvanted split vaccine 
formulations containing varying doses of HA, ranging from 7.5μg to 30μg HA [51]. As has been 
sporadically observed previously, the use of alum in this trial did not improve the vaccine performance 
[32-34]. For the 15μg non-adjuvanted treatment group about 87% of all subjects elicited 
haemagglutination-inhibition antibody titres ≥ 40 at three weeks post-vaccination, increasing to 97% at 
five weeks after the second dose. The age group 12-60 years gave the most vigorous response, with 
over 97% of subjects reaching protective levels of haemagglutination-inhibition antibodies after one 
dose. The authors conclude that one dose of 15μg may be sufficient to provide a protective immune 
response in the age group 12-60 years, whereas they argue that younger children and the elderly may 
require two doses. The 7.5μg treatment group of the study did not have a non-adjuvanted arm. In a 
dose-sparing perspective and considering the data presented, it is tempting to speculate whether a  
7.5 μg formulation without alum might have elicited a satisfactory response. 
The European study [52] tested subjects in the age group 18-50 years given MDCK cell-grown 
virus formulated as a subunit vaccine adjuvanted with MF59. The trial had a complex design and only 
the adjuvanted 7.5 μg and 15 μg (=2 x 7.5 μg) data were presented. Both vaccine strengths induced 
protective levels of anti-haemagglutination-inhibition antibodies (80% and 92%, respectively) and 
neutralizing antibodies (100% and 100%, respectively) at day 21 post-vaccination. Although the 
results from all the treatment groups were not presented in this interim report, and not knowing the 
results from the non-adjuvanted formulations, one may speculate whether a 7.5 μg adjuvanted dose 
may be adequate. It should be noted that the GSK pandemic H1N1 vaccine, adjuvanted with ASO3, 
and now in use in many countries, contains 3.8 μg HA per dose.  
2.3. Immunological Challenges 
In contrast to the current H1N1 pandemic, an eventual pandemic caused by the avian H5N1 would 
have met a virtually immunologically naïve global population and potentially caused a very high Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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number of excess deaths. The compiled data for the zoonotic H5N1 cases suggest an overall case-
fatality rate of 59% (262/442), with Indonesia standing out with 82% (115/141) [54]. In the event of a 
sustained human-to-human spread, it must be assumed that the fatality rates will not reach such high 
levels. The antigenic and genetic diversity of the avian H5N1 is a particular challenge for vaccine 
development. There are substantial antigenic differences between clades and subclades having 
consequences for vaccine development. So far, the WHO advocates that viruses from clades 1 and 2 
should be used as vaccine seeds [55]. Whether or not an H5N1 pandemic will occur we cannot know, 
of course, nor is it possible to predict which clade and strain will eventually emerge as the pandemic 
virus. This makes pre-pandemic preparations of trial lots of H5N1 vaccines complicated. On the other 
hand, this uncertainty has stimulated research and development work, particularly when it comes to 
generating a strong cross-reactive vaccine response. Consequently, it has highlighted the importance of 
generating cellular immunity, predominately elicited against the internal and less variable antigens of 
the virus, namely the type-specific NP and M1 proteins, thus eliciting an immune response being more 
robust to antigenic changes. 
The H1N1 pandemic situation is in many ways the complete opposite to the H5N1 threat. While the 
number of highly lethal zoonotic H5N1 cases has slowly continued to increase throughout the recent 
years, the virus still has not adapted sufficiently to allow effective human-to-human transmission to 
sustain community-level outbreaks. For the H5N1 virus we have been in the WHO pandemic phase 3 
for six years (since 2003). It may well be that pandemic viruses not necessarily must emerge via an 
human adaption process from a zoonotic case, or as a result of a singular reassortment event between 
an animal and human strain. There could also be several reassortment incidents, all spaced in time and 
place, and involving different animal species, as highlighted for the recent H1N1 pandemic by Smith 
et al. [56]. We should therefore not lose sight of the H5N1 threat.  
Ideally, a candidate pandemic influenza vaccine should elicit a rapid and strong humoral and cell-
mediated immune response, and ideally also a strong mucosal response, which are long-lasting and 
exhibit broad cross-reactivity against drifted strains (within and across different clades). To date, most 
published results from animal studies and clinical trials of parenteral pandemic avian influenza H5N1 
virus vaccines have highlighted the need for high antigen doses or an effective adjuvant to elicit a 
satisfactory antibody response, as highlighted by Hehme et al. [19] and Treanor et al. [23,24]. 
It is widely accepted that serum antibodies directed against the HA correlate with protection against 
seasonal influenza. However, there is convincing evidence, that both CD4
+ T helper cells and CD8
+ 
cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTL) may play an important role in controlling viral infection and reduce 
the severity of disease and decrease mortality [57,58]. It has been well established that purified viral 
proteins formulated with oil-in-water adjuvants, stimulate the Th1 arm of the post-vaccination 
response. The same is also seen for inactivated whole virion vaccines and VLP formulations. It is 
assumed that viral proteins are entering the antigen-presenting cell via the endosomal pathway into the 
cytosol for subsequent presentation of viral peptides on MHC Class I, thus mimicking the infectious 
process. Also vaccine formulations with ISCOMs have been extensively studied and demonstrated 
CTL responses (reviewed by Rimmelzwaan et al. [59]. Therefore, the use of whole virion vaccines 
formulations, VLPs and/or the use of Th1 stimulating adjuvants would greatly improve vaccine 
performance. Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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Current vaccine seeds, whether prepared by classical reassortment or by reverse genetics, will, - by 
design,- not contain the NP and M1 proteins from the epidemic/pandemic strain, but from an historic 
laboratory reassortment partner. One may speculate whether this could constitute a disadvantage when 
aiming at stimulating a more authentic CTL response. One manufacturer (Baxter) uses the unmodified 
field virus as seed strain for their cell-grown inactivated whole virus vaccines, and in the context of 
cellular response this approach may well turn out to be especially advantageous. 
The three pandemic H1N1 clinical studies just published [50-52] are mostly presenting preliminary 
results. The finer details of the immune response, e.g. Th1/Th2 profile and cross-reactions with 
emerging variant strains, will hopefully be presented in due time. Regarding the need for one or two 
doses, even if one dose satisfied licensing requirements, only follow-up studies of longevity of 
antibodies and humoral and eventual cellular memory will clarify this issue.  
The poor immunogenicity of pandemic vaccines against H5 and H7 avian subtypes appears not to have 
repeated itself for the currently used H1N1 pandemic vaccines. This is a comforting finding. 
Mucosal immunity may also provide protection against infection per se and not only protection 
against illness. Therefore, needle-free mucosal influenza vaccine is an attractive approach, which may 
provide immunity at the portal of virus entry. Additionally, mucosal IgA has broader specificity than 
serum IgG and may provide better cross-clade protection against drifted influenza strains [60,61]. 
However, although demonstrating stimulation of secretory IgA when using intranasal route for 
administration of influenza antigen alone, i.e. a non-live formulation, the immunogenicity is frequently 
poor [62-64]. Use of an appropriate nasal adjuvant could improve immunogenicity and thus reduce the 
required dosage [65]. One should, however, not forget the many cases of Bell’s palsy associated with a 
recent clinical trial involving intranasal vaccination [66]. 
Therefore, safe and effective mucosal adjuvants are urgently needed. A recent murine study with 
sublingual administration of an adjuvanted H1N1 vaccine has shown good mucosal immunity reflected 
by high IgA levels in the respiratory tract and provided protection against viral challenge [67]. 
Sublingual administration of a pandemic vaccine may significantly contribute to the pandemic 
preparedness through its ease of administration and better public compliance. Additionally, sublingual 
vaccines are less likely to induce neurological disorders and most probably a safer alternative than the 
intranasal vaccine for mucosal delivery, avoiding the potential exposure of the olfactory bulb [66]. 
Provided not excessive use of antigenic material is required, this alternative route should have much to 
offer and warrants further studies.  
Few reports have addressed the long-lasting immunity and memory response after pandemic 
influenza vaccines [38,40]. Most of the published data evaluated the response in the immediate weeks 
after vaccination, which may underestimate the long-term protection against influenza viruses. 
However, it is difficult to assess the precise longevity of vaccine-induced immunity in the field, as 
influenza viruses undergo a continual antigenic variation (‘antigenic drft’). It is for this reason 
seasonal vaccination is recommended annually. Therefore, long-term humoral and cellular immunity 
after pandemic vaccines should be evaluated considering that more than one pandemic wave may 
occur [68]. Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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2.4. New Production Platforms 
Despite recent decades’ many new technical-scientific advances, the influenza vaccine production 
platforms have essentially remained unchanged [69]. While egg-grown influenza vaccines in the 
1950’ties where initially rather reactogenic, subsequent introduction of zonal centrifugation 
purification steps, and also the introduction of detergent-split virions, greatly reduced its 
reactogenicity. Throughout the later parts of the 20
th century the global production capacity, and the 
actual use of vaccine against seasonal influenza, has steadily increased. Most manufacturers still grow 
viruses in embryonated hens’ eggs, whereas a small number of companies use cell cultures (Vero, 
MDCK, PER.C6®), either as their only substrate or as a supplement to eggs. The use of embryonated 
eggs is a critical point, as an emergency decision to scale up the production may not easily be 
accomplished as quality assured eggs must be ordered many months in advance. Adding to this 
complexity is the season-dependent quality of embryonated eggs, affecting the resultant viral yield. 
Production platforms based on approved cell lines are more controllable and more straightforward to 
scale up. One should not forget, however, that the availability of approved sites for bioreactors might 
potentially be a limiting factor. The fragile egg-based system is demonstrating its shortcomings during 
times of a pandemic urgency, such as today. Also, high pathogenic avian influenza viruses may add to 
the complexity by making the egg-laying flocks more vulnerable. Adding to this is the rare, but very 
critical consequences for vaccine output, when bacterially contaminated eggs are entering the 
production lines. This was clearly demonstrated in 2004 [70]. There is therefore a need for several 
new, or at least supplementary, vaccine production systems being more robust, more flexible and 
easier to scale up. 
While some plasmid DNA vaccines have shown some promising results in animal models, there is 
still a way to go for generating effective human DNA vaccines. There is also a public acceptance issue 
to consider. In contrast, recent years industrial use of recombinant DNA technology, allowing 
generation of viral proteins to be made in large quantities in various host cells, hold promise for future 
vaccine technologies. In the context of influenza both DNA vaccines and recombinant protein 
preparations produced in insect and E.coli cell cultures have been used, some of them have got into 
clinical trials [71-75]. Although the strategy of producing edible vaccines has not been abandoned, the 
transient expression of engineered vaccine proteins in plant cells has shown promise. Such low cost 
systems are considered safe and can easily be scaled up (see review [76]). None of these new platforms 
have hitherto made any noteworthy contribution to the global annual influenza vaccine output. This 
will probably change in the years to come. Still, of the more than 70 pre-H1N1 registered trials with 
vaccines against pandemic influenza, several have used DNA vaccines, recombinant proteins made in 
E. coli and by engineered baculovirus in insect cells [18]. The most attractive property of the new 
production platforms is their claim to produce very large quantities of vaccine material within a short 
time. This is exemplified by a recent press release from VaxInnate Corp [77]. Using engineered 
bacterial flagellin, a TLR agonist, carrying viral sequences and targeting antigen presenting cells, they 
claimed that 300 millions H1N1 doses could be produced in weeks rather than months.  Viruses 2009, 1                                       
 
 
1100
2.5. Limited Supply and Global Equity 
For a pandemic, the ultimate objective is to produce enough vaccine to immunize the world's entire 
population (6.7 billion people) with 2 doses, within 6-9 months, anticipating 5 µg HA/dose [78]. As 
mentioned previously, the total global output capacity for trivalent seasonal vaccines, requiring 15 µg 
HA for each strain, is estimated to reach approximately 1 billion doses by 2010 [79]. Assuming that all 
production capacity is completely switched to manufacture pandemic vaccines, and that 2 doses of  
5 µg HA per dose is required, this will translate to approximately 4.5 billion immunization courses, 
representing about 67% of the global need. Such calculations will of course depend heavily on whether 
2 doses are necessary for all age groups, which dose strength is required to satisfy licensing 
requirements, and whether dose-sparing adjuvants will be used. (Table 3). Considering the mixed 
type/subtype/strain influenza epidemiology during recent months, it is reasonable to assume that both 
A/H3N2 and B viruses, and possibly also the seasonal A/H1N1 virus, will continue to circulate. The 
calculations presented in Table 3 are therefore only representing a best case and probably also an 
unlikely scenario where manufacturers only have to consider one influenza vaccine strain.  
Table 3. Different scenarios for global availability of (monovalent) pandemic vaccine 
2010. Vaccine courses in millions. 
  1 dose to all  2 doses to all  70% 1 dose, 30% 2 doses 
HA per dose 
No of 
vaccinatio
n courses 
Global 
coverage 
No of 
vaccination 
courses 
Global 
coverage 
No of 
vaccination 
courses 
Global 
coverage 
15 µg  3,000  45% 1,500 22% 2,300  34% 
10 µg  4,500  67% 2,250 34% 3,450  52% 
5 µg  9,000  >100% 4,500  67% 6,900 >100 % 
Calculations are based on an estimated global production capacity of trivalent seasonal influenza vaccines to be 
1 billion doses in 2010, each with 15 µg HA, and a global population of 6.7 billion. 
 
Most importantly, for these calculations it is assumed that the growth characteristics of the seed 
virus will be about as good as recent years’ vaccine strains. WHO published an overview of viral 
characteristics with recommendations for vaccine development as early as 26 May, 2009 [80]. 
However, the growth characteristics of the pandemic H1N1 seed strains so far having being distributed 
to manufacturers have been questioned, thus the initial estimates of number of available doses may 
well be less than was optimistically suggested in Table 3. Still, there is substantial dose-stretching 
potential if the HA dosage can be reduced. Based on recent studies [50-52] it is also apparent that if 
certain age-cohorts only need one and not two vaccine doses, tentatively shown as 70% of the 
population in Table 2, there is a saving to be gained. Also, the use of intradermal immunization may 
offer savings in the order of about 80% in antigen usage [81-83]. When there is a global scarcity of 
vaccine, particularly when facing a pandemic, such an approach should be seriously considered. It 
should also be noted that the calculations in Table 3 show the theoretical capacity to provide a 
pandemic H1N1 vaccine for the global population, varying from 22% to full coverage. In reality, the 
situation will be quite different, since the doses will not be delivered in full at one specifically set date. Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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According to calculations by the WHO approximately 50% of total output will be available within 6 
months [84]. 
Based on currently used technologies there is a five-six month lead-time from having identified the 
pandemic strain to release of the first vaccine lots [85]. This includes generating seed virus   
(by classical reassortment or by reverse genetics), preparing reference sera and antigens for potency 
standardization purposes, optimizing manufacturing processes, bulk manufacture, quality control, 
vaccine filling, clinical studies and regulatory approval [86]. For the preparation of seed virus, the use 
of reverse genetics in lieu of classical reassortments, has the potential of cutting several weeks off this 
time-line. Furthermore, the licensing hurdle can be dramatically shortened if the manufacturer has 
submitted and received approval for a mock-up process with the same subtype (but a different strain) 
without any change of the manufacturing process.  
Clearly, using classical production platforms the necessary total global influenza vaccine output 
could possibly be within reach within the next few years, but the long lead-time required to provide 
enough vaccine in time for the entire global population is not acceptable. Following the H1N1 
pandemic some countries have activated their dormant contractual arrangements with the 
pharmaceutical industry for prioritized delivery of vaccines for their populations. Global solidarity 
issues will be raised, and rich countries with such exclusive contracts will be asked to share their 
vaccine allocations with less affluent countries. While national politicians no doubt will battle with 
this quandary, it is reassuring to know that several vaccine manufacturers have pledged donations of 
millions of doses of pandemic vaccine to the WHO for subsequent distribution to low-income 
countries. To what extent national authorities, particularly those hosting vaccine manufacturers, will 
activate emergency statutes and ban export of such a life-saving commodity before their domestic need 
is satisfied, remains to be seen. It will most certainly depend upon how the clinical pattern of the 
H1N1 pandemic develops, assuming that a less virulent strain will translate into more generosity 
3. Conclusions 
Currently, we are in a unique pandemic situation. While the avian H5N1 virus has been in WHO 
phase 3 since 2004, the newly emerged H1N1 virus spread rapidly and developed into a full pandemic 
(phase 6) within a couple of months. Whether this two-pronged threat is unique in a historical 
perspective is impossible to say, nor is it possible to know how this scenario will play out. On 11 June 
2009, Dr. Margareth Chen, Director General of the World Health Organization, said during a press 
conference when the pandemic was declared: “We are in the earliest days of the pandemic. The virus 
is spreading under a close and careful watch. No previous pandemic has been detected so early or 
watched so closely, in real-time, right at the very beginning.” Modern biological sciences have made 
big strides allowing detailed and almost in real time generation of data to enable analyses of the 
genetic make-up of the novel strain and present evidence-based scientific opinions about the origin of 
the emerging virus.  
During the pandemics of 1957 and 1968 the new pandemic virus replaced the preceding subtype, 
from H1N1 to H2N2 and from H2N2 to H3N2, respectively. The reappearance of H1N1 in 1977 did 
not replace the current H3N2, and the two influenza A subtypes have continued to co-circulate. It is 
not known how the current and mixed situation will turn out. Will the seasonal H1N1 virus disappear Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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and be replaced by the pandemic H1N1 virus? Will the H3N2 virus continue to circulate? These are 
important questions, as it will have profound consequences for the formulations of seasonal influenza 
vaccines during the coming seasons. 
Still, when it comes to chemo-prophylaxis and -therapy, science has not made giant leaps. Influenza 
drugs are available, and the adamantanes (amantadin and rimantadin) have been used against influenza 
A for more than four decades, whereas the last decade’s neuraminidase inhibitors are targeting the 
viral NA function both for A and B viruses. However, drug resistance could make them less useful or 
even redundant, as widespread indiscriminate and ad lib use of antivirals in some countries will 
facilitate emergence of drug resistant strains. 
As for community mitigation, we have to rely on old and well-proven interventions, while 
recognizing that modern societies are extremely vulnerable to large-scale absenteeism from work, 
particularly in the health services, and that modern days industrial wheels require an uninterrupted 
global trade for supply of goods and raw materials. For the third world in particular, the health and 
societal consequences could be even more destructive, realizing that drugs and vaccines will be scarce 
or not available. 
A tailor-made pandemic vaccine, i.e. using approved strains representing the actual pandemic virus, 
is our best prophylactic option. While for the avian H5N1 virus, it has been argued that the use of a 
prepandemic vaccine, say in the eventual phase 4 or 5, using a vaccine dose and formulation that 
elicits a high degree of cross-reaction between strains of different H5 clades, - is an attractive option. 
For the pandemic H1N1 virus, events developed so rapidly that only a vaccine based on a 
representative and widespread strain will be acceptable. We were not given the time to develop and 
license prepandemic vaccine. It is important that while tackling the current H1N1 pandemic, we should 
not lose sight of the H5N1 warning. It could adapt to humans and develop into a human pandemic 
strain, or it could reassort with current human strains. The H1N1 pandemic virus is in this respect a 
worrying partner.  
There is much vaccine development work to be undertaken. We need new vaccines eliciting a better 
cellular response where safe adjuvants will be crucial, and we need vaccines generating a long-lived 
and strong mucosal response. We should increase our efforts to stretch a limited vaccine supply, and 
the emerging new production platforms will here have a pivotal rôle. 
Unfortunately, all those in need of vaccine will not get it in time, as the primary limiting factors are 
manufacturing speed and volume. Some quantities of pandemic vaccine will be available before the 
winter season 2009/10 starts in the northern hemisphere, whereas the southern hemisphere has battled 
with the first pandemic wave without access to vaccine. While the antigenic and genetic make-up of 
the pandemic H1N1 virus has hitherto been remarkably stable, this could change. The spread of the 
H1N1 virus among overcrowded and destitute townships in metropolitan areas and in communities 
already burdened by HIV, malaria and tuberculosis, could facilitate change of viral pathogenicity and 
antigenicity. An increased case-fatality rate is therefore a real concern. It will also be a question 
whether the pandemic vaccines now being prepared will be antigenically well matched with new 
variant field strains that may emerge during the coming months. Still, the litmus test for global 
solidarity will be whether the rich countries of the world, as well as the pharmaceutical industry, in a 
timely fashion are willing to share or donate significant quantities of antivirals and pandemic vaccine 
doses to the poorer nations. Viruses 2009, 1                                       
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